But what's far more interesting than the punditry (or today's Wall Street Journal editorial -- what do they do there, sit around and think of what the President must do then say that's wrong?) are the comments on the news websites.
Among the more noteworthy:
- The Rolling Stone reporter should have "reminded" McChrystal he was on the record. Oh...
- Obama's "body language" at the press conference was "mean." (Did this writer ever catch a glimpse of Dick Cheney?)
But, I think there's some reason out there. This, from Slate.com, by David Colburne (wish I'd have written most of this):
I'm not a big Obama fan by any stretch of the imagine, but I have to admit, this was a really shrewd move on his part. This successfully accomplished three things:
1. It communicated to Karzai that we really don't give a damn what he thinks. He went to bat for McChrystal and we ignored him. Good. Now he needs to deal with someone that's used to politicking with local leaders (or buying them off - seriously, whatever works at this point) instead of someone trying to force a top-down approach on Afghanistan. COIN just says you need to build a stable government; it doesn't say it has to be run exclusively from Kabul.
2. It puts the advocates of COIN on notice. This is their last shot. They have the one who literally wrote the book on COIN in charge - if Petraeus doesn't turn it around, nobody could.
3. If Petraeus doesn't turn it around, nobody could, which means that, if he doesn't, Obama can safely walk away while saying we gave it our best shot. That's powerful political cover right there.
Honestly, I really hope Petraeus finds some way to pull this off, whatever this is, exactly. Iraq, for all its present faults, is in much better condition now than it was before Petraeus took over, and that's given us the political cover we need to "declare victory" and start pulling out from there. If he can get Afghanistan to "good enough" in a fairly short time, I can live with that. Though I don't think we should be in Afghanistan at all, I'd rather see us leave on terms that everybody can agree with than deal with another few decades of Vietnam-style "what if", with one side reflexively deriding anything military-related and the other side declaring that we need to "double down" on every little skirmish our troops get into.
Having said that, McChrystal was a classic Patton-style general. He had a flair for the dramatic, only followed the rules when it was convenient to do so, was much more comfortable in the field than he was in socially high status situations, never knew when to shut up, and was known for "getting stuff done". Such generals are fantastic on the field, but miserable failures when you need political acumen along with a solid understanding of strategic and tactical skill. Unfortunately, leading a theater is less about strategy and more about politics - you have to balance the needs of your generals, your allies, the civilian leadership on the ground, and Washington, and hope and pray that you can craft something that everyone can agree or tolerate. You can't do that if you openly disdain your allies, the local civilian leadership and Washington. You also can't do it if you view policy and procedure as an impediment instead of as a tool.
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